Security of an ideal system for quantum key distribution can be formally proved. However, technological imperfections of real systems can be misused by an eavesdropper to get information about the key without causing a detectable change in the error rate. An example of this is the blinding attack where the eavesdropper manipulates detectors of the receiving party. To avoid such an attack, technical modifications of the device are usually required. In this paper we show that an extended measurement, similar to the Bell test measurement, can reveal the blinding attack without any modification of the device.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a provably secure cryptographic primitive [1] . However, security proofs of real systems always start from mathematical models of the devices. If there are any imperfections or hidden features of the device which are not properly treated by the model, they can be misused for "zero-error" eavesdropping. A nice example of this is the so called blinding attack [2] .
For concreteness, let us talk about a polarization implementation of the BB84 protocol [3] . Conventionally, we will denote the communication parties as Alice and Bob and an eavesdropper will be named Eve. In the blinding attack Eve blinds Bob's detectors by a strong continuous-wave beam. She measures the state sent by Alice in one of the BB84 bases. Then she sends a classical signal of the same polarization as the measured result. Its intensity is slightly above a threshold level. If Bob measures in the same basis as Eve, he always gets the "proper" output (the same as Eve) because the intensity at the respective detector exceeds the threshold and the detector definitely clicks. But if he measures in the conjugate basis, no detector clicks because now the intensity of Eve's signal incident on each detector is below the threshold. To avoid such an attack, technical modification of the detector circuits or additional optical components to monitor the intensity of light are usually required [4] . In this paper we show how to detect the blinding attack by an extended measurement, similar to the Bell test measurement, without any changes in detection electronics or optical setup. It is an important advantage because any technical work around, one introduces into the system, can become compromised at some unknown point in the future.
Bell's inequalities [5] allows exclusion of local-realistic theories and in quantum mechanics they can be used as a criterion of separability. Their violation signifies the presence of an entangled state. The most often used version of Bell's inequalities is that proposed by Clauser, Horne, Shimony, and Holt -so called CHSH inequality [6] . Let us suppose that two parties, Alice and Bob, share an entangled state
, where |H and |V are orthogonal basis states of a single particle, e.g., polarization states of a photon (with H being horizontal and V vertical linear polarization). To test the CHSH inequality Alice randomly measures in two linearpolarization bases. Her first basis, A, is rotated by 0
• , while the other one, A ′ , is rotated by 45
• (these bases are equivalent to the BB84 bases). Bob measures in two different polarization bases: His first basis, B, is rotated by 112.5
• , the other one, B ′ , is rotated by 67. Tests of Bell's inequalities can be also used to guarantee the security of entanglement-based QKD [7] . However, if the source of pairs is safely located at Alice's side then the entanglement-based systems are formally equivalent to the prepare-and-measure systems. Such quantum cryptography setups were proposed and have been studied in several publications [8] [9] [10] . In this paper we will show explicitly how the power of this method can be used to detect the blinding attacks.
The principle of the proposed countermeasure is as follows: Let us assume prepare-and-measure BB84 QKD. Let Eve employ the blinding attack against Bob as described above. Now, let us suppose that from time to time Bob also measures in the two CHSH bases, B and B ′ , defined earlier (these bases lay "in between" the BB84 bases). At the end Alice and Bob use these measurements to check the CHSH inequality. If Bob and Eve measure in the BB84 bases (which are equivalent to A and A ′ ) Eve can read the whole key without causing any errors in transmission. However, when Bob switches to the CHSH bases there are two possibilities depending on the intensity of Eve's pulse: Either none of Bob's detectors clicks or the measurement outputs (together with Alice's values) will not violate the CHSH inequality. So if later Alice and Bob separate these measurements they can check if they are non-zero and if so they can calculate the value of B. If there is no attack, the CHSH inequality should be violated, |B| > 2. On the other hand, the fulfillment of the CHSH inequality, |B| ≤ 2, will reveal the attack.
II. THEORY
For concreteness we will continue considering polarization implementation, but the reasoning is valid for any kind of encoding. Let us suppose that Alice sends the following four linearly polarized states of a single photon, each with probability 25%. Polarizations are characterized by their angles, |θ = cos θ|H + sin θ|V :
Eve makes projective measurements using a basis consisting of linear-polarization states characterized by angles γ + and γ − = γ + +90
• . Then she sends a strong pulse towards Bob with the same linear polarization as she has measured and with intensity I ∈ (I th , 2I th ) where I th is the threshold intensity (intensities outside this interval are useless for Eve).
Bob measures in four bases: Two BB84 bases, which are the same as those used by Alice (Bob uses them with probability p 1 ). Two CHSH bases (used with probability p 2 ) consisting of linear-polarization states determined by the following angles:
• (+1 in basis B), β − = 202.5
• (−1 in basis B), β ′ + = 67.5
• (+1 in basis B ′ ), β ′ − = 157.5
• (−1 in basis B ′ ).
When subjected to the blinding attack, Bob's detector clicks if I cos 2 (γ − β) ≥ I th , where I is the intensity of the pulse sent by Eve. Let us define a function Q(θ) = 1 if I cos 2 θ − I th ≥ 0, 0 otherwise, where 1 means that the detector clicks and 0 that it doesn't. Just for convenience let us also defineQ(θ) = Q(θ ± 90
• ). Let us now calculate probabilities of obtaining various combinations of values +1 and −1 for a given combination of bases used by Alice and Bob. We suppose that Alice sends all her states with the same probability, so that for a selected basis the probability of +1 is the same as the probability of −1 and equals to 50%. Further, we will use the fact that the probability of getting outcome |φ when incoming state is |θ reads | φ|θ | 2 = cos 2 (φ−θ) for linear polarization states. We will also make substitutions based on the definition θ − = θ + + 90
• and employ simplification cos 2 (θ ± 90 • ) = sin 2 θ. For the bases A and B we have, e.g., P
For all the other combinations of bases, the probabilities can be obtained in an analogous way. Notice that because I th < I < 2I th , at most one out of the two functions, Q(θ) andQ(θ), can be nonzero. Thus, Q(θ) +Q(θ) equals to either 0 or 1. Because we take into account only the cases when Bob detects anything, the probabilities defined above should sum to unity and this is possible only if Q(θ) +Q(θ) = 1. The situation when both Q(θ) andQ(θ) are zero means that for given Eve's and Bob's measurement angles and given intensity of Eve's pulse there are no detection events at Bob's detectors. Thus, the detection rate for such a setting is zero and the corresponding correlation functions are zero by definition. With these prerequisites we can calculate correlation functions between the Alice's values and the Bob's detection outputs when he measured in one of the CHSH bases, B or B ′ :
and similarly for A ′ B , AB ′ and A ′ B ′ . Now it is easy to calculate that
Here we have considered that Bob uses the bases B and B ′ equiprobably. Taking into account that only one of the functions Q(θ) andQ(θ) can be nonzero and because | cos(θ)| ≤ 1, one can see that |B| ≤ 2 for any angle γ + .
Of course, Eve can alternate measurements in different bases (characterized by different angles γ + ). In such a case the overall value of CHSH quantity,B, is given as a convex combination of Bs corresponding to individual angles γ + . Thus, it is clear that also |B| ≤ 2. In other words, the blinding attack will always lead to the fulfillment (non-violation) of the CHSH inequality (or to zero detection rate in CHSH bases). If Eve tried to measure in bases different from that of Alice, she would necessarily introduce a nonzero error rate to BB84 key distribution but she still would not be able to violate the CHSH inequality [11] .
III. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
We have shown that the extension of Bob's measurement bases in a way which enables the communicating parties to test violation of the inequality of CHSH type in prepare-and-measure QKD can lead to avoiding the blinding attack without any modification of the detection electronics. It is always an important advantage if attacks can be countered by fundamental principles rather than technical implementations. Unfortunately, even the described method is not universal. For example, it cannot detect the time-shift attack [12] in which Eve does not measure anything but only slightly shifts Alice's signals in time. However, we believe that our approach -and in general semi-device-independent QKDcan represent the first step towards the protocols whose security against a large class of "zero-error" attacks will be formally provable.
